Kite Festival

Rino Bnao EN 101-4 Karen Millam Sep 14, 2012 Taiwanese Kite Festival Kite Festival is the event where people made different kind of kites to fly them. Few days ago I went to Delap to attend the kite festival. I really enjoyed the event and although there are many reasons why I like about the kite Festival, few major facts why I like the event the most and catches my attention. First reason why I like the event is that the Taiwanese allowed the kids to fly and played their kites. Each kid that I saw during the event was really happy.They enjoyed playing with the different kind of kites. The Taiwanese even gave the kids each a small kite that they can play with it and fly it around and enjoyed the day. Another reason why I like the event is the Kites. There are about ten to fifteen kites that flying in the air. Each kite shape like different kind of animals and that one thing that catches my attention. I even asked myself why is all the kites shape like an animal. Later on after interv iewing or talking with one of the team member, I found out that an animal is the best shape that they used.He said that the every entire kite they fly will always be an animal’s shape. Each kite has different kind of color and they look bright with their color. Finally I like the event because I learn something from it. First thing that I learn is how to make it and what materials that used to make a kite. According to them, Bamboo stick and silk is the best material to make a kite. They show us how they made it and it was really awesome seeing them making a kite for the kids.I also learn that the event is really important because they bring back the Taiwanese or Chinese history and of course bring flying sport to Marshall Island. Also learned what are the kite for and there are many things that they can use for the kite. For example they used the kite for sport and also for war. Small or big kites can be both useful for many reasons. In conclusion, I really admired the color ful kites that surrounded me. I enjoyed the event because I learn good thing about kite and how useful, colorful, awesome they are. This entire thing catches my attention. I was surprise when I saw them.

Societys Perception About Weight

The topic of weight is very prevalent among people in today's society. Everywhere we look we find people of all sorts of different weights and appearances. Tall, small, thin, wide, fat and skinny are just a variety of the words we use to describe people. Almost no one is completely happy with their weight. We are constantly looking for ways to better ourselves and improve our physical appearance. It is this paper's purpose to provide information in helping a person feel comfortable with their weight and aid in determining an ideal body weight for you. Topics also include: society's view on weight, the dangers of various weight-related disorders and diseases, and methods of achieving a recommended healthy weight. The goal is that once you have the proper information you will be able to achieve this ideal weight safely and on your own, giving you an ultimate sense of satisfaction. The question that is constantly being asked is just what is the ideal healthy weight? The ideal body weight is different for every individual as healthy ideal weight depends on a person's sex, race, and genetics. To quickly simplify and determine an individual's ideal weight we use a simple chart called the Body Mass Index or BMI for short. This chart determines how much a person should weigh. People can calculate their BMI by dividing their weight in pounds by their height in inches squared and multiplying the resulting number by 704. 5 (Woods 98). A person who weighs 164 pounds and is 68 inches would do the following calculation: 164/4624 x 704. 5 = 25 BMI. A BMI between 18. 5-24. 9 is normal and is called the safe zone (Woods 98). The people in this recommended safe zone are considered to be in the best health. A BMI less than 18. 5 usually means that a person is underweight (Woods 98). Studies indicate that the underweight have an increased risk of death compared to those of normal weight. A BMI of over 30 means obesity, and obese people take a lot of health risks (Woods 98). People with obesity have an increased risk of: high blood pressure, heart attacks, stroke, the most common form of diabetes, gallbladder disease, arthritis, respiratory problems, and certain types of cancer. As long as you fall into or close to the recommended safe zone you should feel comfortable and happy with your weight the way it is. This paper will now discuss the dangers that society's infatuation with weight can have on a person. It will also provide methods on how a person can change to find a comfortable and healthy weight. Eating disorders are a common and very realistic part of our society. They are seen as the most dangerous health related risks involving weight. Dieting, binge-eating and food obsessions are prevalent among all weight groups. Many people strive to be lighter than their natural weights and exercise excessively and eat sparingly to attain an often-unrealistic weight goal. Societal pressures share blame for producing eating disorders. Some victims of eating disorders feel that others are pressuring them to be thin, making them feel guilty about what they eat (Washington 99). They become isolated from family and friends and turn to food as a release and source of comfort (Washington 99). People with eating disorders excessively exercise and are known to induce vomiting after eating or drinking (Washington 99). Eating disorders target many people in society. The main target group is females, especially in the traditionally masculine cultures. Society places a great deal of emphasis on the physical appearance of a person's body and this alone is enough to drive someone into an eating disorder. An example is the supermodel with the skin and bones look whom you see on television. With this in mind many women might look at their weight and find themselves socially unacceptable. The result can be an eating disorder. Another target group is athletes. For example, in the sport of gymnastics there is pressure on the female athlete to maintain a low weight and petite slim figure. Since gymnastics is judged on how an athlete looks in competition many gymnasts develop an eating disorder as a result of the importance of body image to the sport. Another example of the occurrence of eating disorders is in boxing and wrestling. Sometimes there is pressure on the athlete to have a rapid weight loss in order to compete in a lower weight class where he or she might have a better chance of winning. There are two main eating disorders that effect many people in society. They are anorexia and bulimia. Anorexia is a deliberate and obsessive starvation in the pursuit of thinness. It is characterized by an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming obese, or the disturbance in the way one's bodyweight size and shape is perceived by another individual (Clark 96). Bulimia is described as recurrent episodes of binge eating and a lack of control over one's eating behaviour resulting in purging (Clark 96). Purging can be achieved by using laxatives and/or vomiting. Many of the symptoms of eating disorders are similar; however, each disorder is somewhat different. If someone is anorexic, symptoms might be: an extremely thin person, isolation, loneliness, obsessive preoccupation with food as regards: obtaining it, cooking, and eating, and compulsive exercise (Washington 99). If someone is bulimic, you might expect to see: the use of food as a comforter, laxative abuse, mood swings, constant concern about body image and weight, quick trips to the bathroom after meals, excessive exercise, some isolation, and low self-esteem (Washington 99). Both forms of eating disorders are dangerous to your health and can cause major problems, both now and in the future. Some immediate physical problems include constantly feeling cold, bloodshot eyes with dark circles, finger calluses, dizziness, weakness, moodiness, insomnia, swollen glands, sore throat, or dry skin (Washington 99). Some of the long-term effects include gastrointestinal pain, diarrhea and/or constipation, malnutrition, heart attack, permanent damage to internal organs, kidney failure, and death (Washington 99). Family and friends of people affected should be aware of the symptoms and risks associated with disordered eating patterns. It is imperative to avoid becoming a victim to an eating disorder. You will only end up hurting yourself and loved ones around you. Now that the dangers of weight have been discussed an effective method of weight gain and loss will be presented. This information will help you reach a desired ideal weight so you can be happy and take pride in yourself. The topic of weight management is prevalent in today's society and is discussed from two different perspectives. People might think that they are too small or weak and in this case they will want to put on more weight. On the other hand, others might think that they are too big. In this case they will try to reduce their weight. Requirements of caloric intake differ for everyone. These requirements are determined by age, sex, weight and activity level. The simple definition of weight is the balance between caloric intake and caloric expenditure (Berning 96). Your body weight will change when there is a difference between calories taken in and calories burned up. Taking this into account, for the average person to lose weight the caloric intake must be less than caloric expenditure. Put simply, to lose weight you must eat less, exercise more, or a combination of both. For the average person to lose one pound they would have to run about 35 miles or eat 3,500 fewer calories (Berning 96). This is impossible to do in one day. To put this into perspective the following formula is given: 3,500 calories 7 days per week = 500 calories per day. It can than be said that eating 500 calories less per day will result in a weight loss of one pound per week. The same can be said by combining 250 calories less per day and burning 250 calories in exercise. Weight loss is most successful when diet and exercise are combined. The safe weight loss recommendation for the average person is no more than 1-2 pounds per week (Berning 96). By using this method of losing weight a person will decrease their chance of health problems and achieve their ideal weight. This method of weight loss will leave you with a sense of satisfaction and pride in reaching your ideal weight. The same basic theory applies for weight gain. In order to gain weight you need to consume more calories than you expend (Berning 96). Family history plays a major role in the development of a body. For example, people from thin families are less likely to transform their bodies into bulky muscular ones. A person can increase his chance of gaining weight with improved nutrition and appropriate weight training. Muscle is gained through intense training and the consumption of additional calories. For each pound gained as muscle you would need to consume 500-1000 additional calories each day (Berning 96). The key to weight gain is consistency and with a little hard work the average person should be able to get to his/her desired ideal weight. By combining a high calorie diet and a rigid exercise program you will find that your body will produce weight in the form of muscle, making you healthy and giving you your desired physical body image. We all must act together and make it our priority to help change society's perception of body images. This can protect everyone by making others feel comfortable with their weight and prevent them from developing eating disorders. Education is essential. By studying our ideal weight in the BMI chart and keeping an eye on the amount of calories in our diet we can stay healthy and feel good about ourselves. This process is aided through complete reinforcement and support from our family and friends. It doesn't stop there as we all must refrain from prejudicial treatment of fat or thin people and see beyond their weight. It is only then that we can feel comfortable with our weight and develop satisfaction in knowing that we have obtained an ideal healthy lifestyle for ourselves.

EMI and the CT Scanner Essay

In early 1972 there was considerable disagreement among top management at EMI Ltd, the UKbased music, electronics, and leisure company. The subject of the controversy was the CT scanner, a new medical diagnostic imaging device that had been developed by the group’s Central Research Laboratory (CRL). At issue was the decision to enter this new business, thereby launching a diversification move that many felt was necessary if the company was to continue to prosper. Complicating the problem was the fact that this revolutionary new product would not only take EMI into the fast-changing and highly competitive medical equipment business, but would also require the company to establish operations in North America, a market in which it had no prior experience. In March 1972 EMI’s board was considering an investment proposal for  £6 million to build CT scanner manufacturing facilities in the United Kingdom. Development of the CT Scanner company background and history EMI Ltd traces its origins back to 1898, when the Gramophone Company was founded to import records and gramophones from the United States. It soon established its own manufacturing and recording capabilities, and after a 1931 merger with its major rival, the Columbia Gramophone Company, emerged as the Electric and Musical Industries, Ltd. EMI Ltd quickly earned a reputation as an aggressive technological innovator, developing the automatic record changer, stereophonic records, magnetic recording tape, and the pioneer commercial television system adopted by the BBC in 1937. Beginning in 1939, EMI’s R&D capabilities were redirected by the war effort toward the development of fuses, airborne radar, and other sophisticated  electronic devices. The company emerged from the war with an electronics business, largely geared to defenserelated products, as well as its traditional entertainment businesses. The transition to peacetime was particularly difficult for the electronics division, and its poor performance led to attempts to pursue new industrial and consumer applications. EMI did some exciting pioneering work, and for a while held hopes of being Britain’s leading computer company. Market leadership in major electronics applications remained elusive, however, while the music business boomed. The 1955 acquisition of Capitol Records in the United States, and the subsequent success of the Beatles and other recording groups under contract to EMI, put the company in a very strong financial position as it entered the 1970s. In 1970 the company h ad earned  £21 million before tax on sales of  £215 million, and although extraordinary losses halved those profits in 1971, the company was optimistic for a return to previous profit levels in 1972 (see exhibits 10.1 to 10.3 for EMI’s financial performance). Around that time, a change in top management signaled a change in corporate strategy. John Read, an accountant by training and previously sales director for Ford of Great Britain, was appointed chief executive officer after only four years in the company. Read recognized the risky, even fickle, nature of the music business, which accounted for two-thirds of EMI’s sales and profits. In an effort to change the company’s strategic balance, he began to divert some of its substantial cash flow into numerous acquisitions and internal developments. To encourage internal innovation, Read established a research fund that was to be used to finance innovative developments outside the company’s immediate interests. Among the first projects financed was one proposed by Godfrey Hounsfield, a research scientist in EMI’s Central Research Laboratories (CRL). Hounsfield’s proposal opened up an opportunity for the company to diversify in the fast-growing medical electronics field. ct scanning: the concept In simple terms, Hounsfield’s research proposal was to study the possibility of creating a threedimensional image of an object by taking multiple X-ray measurements of the object from different angles, then using a computer to reconstruct a picture from the data contained in hundreds of overlapping and  intersecting X-ray slices. The concept became known as computerized tomography (CT). Although computerized tomography represented a conceptual breakthrough, the technologies it harnessed were quite well known and understood. Essentially, it linked X-ray, data processing, and cathode ray tube display technologies in a complex and precise manner. The real development challenge consisted of integrating the mechanical, electronic, and radiographic components into an accurate, reliable, and sensitive system. Figure 10.1 provides a schematic representation of the EMI scanner, illustrating the linkage of the three technologies, as well as the patient handling table and X-ray gantry. Progress was rapid, and clinical trials of the CT scanner were under way by late 1970. To capture the image of multiple slices of the brain, the scanner went through a translate-rotate sequence, as illustrated in figure 10.2. The X-ray source and detector, located on opposite sides of the patient’s head, were mounted on a gantry. After each scan, or â€Å"translation,† had generated an X-ray image comprising 160 data points, the gantry would rotate 1 ° and another scan would be made. This procedure would continue through 180 translations and rotations, storing a total of almost 30,000 data points. Since the detected intensity of an X-ray varies with the material through which it passes, the data could be reconstructed by the computer into a threedimensional image of the object that distinguished bone, tissue, water, fat, and so on. At about the time of the CT clinical trials, John Powell, formerly managing director of Texas Instrument’s English subsidiary, joined EMI as technical director. He soon became convinced that the poor profitability of the nonmilitary electronics business was due to the diffusion of the company’s 2,500-person R&D capability over too many diverse small-volume lines. In his words, â€Å"EMI was devoted to too many products and dedicated to too few.† Because the CT scanner project built on the company’s substantial and well-established electronics capability, Powell believed it gave EMI an important opportunity t o enter an exciting new field. He felt that this was exactly the type of effort in which the company should be prepared to invest several million  pounds. Diagnostic Imaging Industry During the first half of the twentieth century, diagnostic information about internal organs and functions was provided almost exclusively by conventional X-ray examination, but in the 1960s hostemostel.com and 1970s, several new imaging techniques emerged. When the CT scanner was announced, three other important technologies existed: X-ray, nuclear, and ultrasound. EMI management believed its CT scanner would displace existing diagnostic imaging equipment in only a few applications, specifically head and brain imaging. x-ray In 1895 Wilhelm Roentgen discovered that rays generated by a cathode ray tube could penetrate solid objects and create an image on film. Over the next 40 to 50 years, X-ray equipment was installed in almost every healthcare facility in the world. Despite its several limitations (primarily due to the fact that detail was obscured when three-dimensional features were superimposed on a two-dimensional image), X-rays were universally used. In 1966 a Surgeon General’s report estimated that between one-third and one-half of all crucial medical decisions in the United States depended on interpretation of X-ray films. That country alone had more than 80,000 X-ray installations in operation, performing almost 150 million procedures in 1970. The X-ray market was dominated by five major global companies. Siemens of West Germany was estimated to have 22 percent of the world market, N.V. Philips of the Netherlands had 18 percent, and Compagnie Generale de Radiologie (CGE), subsidiary of th e French giant Thomson Brandt, held 16 percent. Although General Electric had an estimated 30 percent of the large US market, its weak position abroad gave it only 15 percent of the world market. The fifth largest company was Picker, with 20 percent of the US market, but less than 12 percent worldwide. The size of the US market for X-ray equipment was estimated at $350 million  in 1972, with an additional $350 million in X-ray supplies. The United States was thought to represent 35– 40% of the world market. Despite the maturity of the product, the X-ray market was growing by almost 10% annually in dollar terms during the early 1970s. A conventional X-ray system represented a major capital expenditure for a hospital, with the average system costing more than $100,000 in 1973. In the mid-1960s a nuclear diagnostic imaging procedure was developed. Radioisotopes with a short radioactive life were projected into the body, detected and monitored on a screen, then recorded on film or stored on a tape. Still in an early stage of development, this technology was used to complement or, in some instances, replace a conventional X-ray diagnosis. Both static and dynamic images could be obtained. Following the pioneering development of this field by Nuclear-Chicago, which sold the first nuclear gamma camera in 1962, several other small competitors had entered the field, notably Ohio Nuclear. By the late 1960s larger companies such as Picker were getting involved, and in 1971 GE’s Medical Systems Division announced plans to enter the nuclear medicine field. As new competitors, large and small, entered the market, competition became more aggressive. The average nuclear camera and data processing system sold for about $75,000. By 1973, shipments of nuclear imaging equipment into the US market were estimated to be over $50 million. Ultrasound had been used in medical diagnosis since the 1950s, and the technology advanced significantly in the early 1970s, permitting better-defined images. The technique involves transmitting sonic waves and picking up the echoes, which when converted to electric energy  could create images. Air and bone often provide an acoustic barrier, limiting the use of this technique. But because the patient was not exposed  to radiation, it was widely used as a diagnostic tool in obstetrics and gynecology. In 1973 the ultrasound market was very small, and only a few small companies were reported in the field. Picker, however, was rumored to be doing research in the area. The cost of the equipment was expected to be less than half that of a nuclear camera and support system, and perhaps a third to a quarter that of an X-ray machine. Because of its size, sophistication, progressiveness, and access to funds, the US medical market clearly represented the major opportunity for a new device such as the CT scanner. EMI management was uncertain about the sales potential for their new product, however. As of 1972, there were around 7,000 hospitals in the United States, ranging from tiny rural hospitals with fewer than 10 beds to giant teaching institutions with 1,000 beds or more (see table 10.1). Since the price of the EMI Scanner was expected to be around $400,000, only the largest and financially strongest short-term institutions would be able to afford one. But the company was encouraged by the enthusiasm of the physicians who had seen and worked with the scanner. In the opinion of one leading American neurologist, at least 170 machines would be required by major US hospitals. Indeed, he speculated, the time might come when a neurologist would feel ethically compelled to order a CT scan before making a diagnosis. During the 1960s the radiology departments in many hospitals were recognized as important money-making operations. Increasingly, radiologists were able to commission equipment manufacturers to build specially designed (often esoteric) X-ray systems and applications. As their budgets expanded, the size of the US X-ray market grew from $50 million in 1958 to $350 million in 1972. Of the 15,000 radiologists in the United States, 60 percent were primarily based in offices and 40 percent in hospitals. Little penetration of private clinics was foreseen for the CT scanner. Apart from these broad statistics, EMI had little ability to forecast the potential of the US market for scanners. EMI’s Investment Decision conflicting management views By late 1971 it was clear that the clinical trials were successful and EMI management had to decide whether to make the investment required to develop the CT scanner business. One group of senior managers felt that direct EMI participation was undesirable for three reasons. First, EMI lacked medical product experience. In the early 1970s EMI offered only two very small medical products, a patient-monitoring device and an infrared thermography device, which together represented less than 0.5 percent of the company’s sales. Second, they argued that the manufacturing process would be quite different from EMI’s experience. Most of its electronics work had been in the job shop mode required in producing small numbers of highly specialized defense products on cost-plus government contracts. In scanner production, most of the components were purchased from subcontractors and had to be integrated into a functioning system. Finally, many believed that without a working knowledge of the North American market, where most of the demand for scanners was expected to be, EMI might find it very difficult to build an effective operation from scratch. Among the strongest opponents of EMI’s self-development of this new business was one of the scanner’s earliest sponsors, Dr Broadway, head of the Central Research Laboratory. He emphasized that EMI’s potential competitors in the field had considerably greater technical capabilities and resources. As the major proponent, John Powell needed convincing market information to counter the critics. In early 1972 he asked some of the senior managers how many scanners they thought the company would sell in its first 12 months. Their first estimate was five. Powell told them to think again. They came back with a figure of 12, and were again sent back to reconsider. Finally, with an estimate of 50, Powell felt he could go to bat for the  £6 million  investment, since at this sales level he could project handsome profits from year one. He then prepared an argument that justified the scanner’s fit with EMI’s overall objectives, and outlined a basic strategy for the business. Powell argued that self-development of the CT scanner represented just the sort of vehicle EMI had been seeking to provide some focus to its development effort. By definition, diversification away from existing product-market areas would move the company into somewhat unfamiliar territory, but he firmly believed that the financial and strategic payoffs would be huge. The product offered access to global markets and an entry into the lucrative medical equipment field. He felt the company’s objective should be to achieve a substantial share of the world medical electronics business not only in diagnostic imaging, but also through the extension of its technologies into computerized patient planning and radiation therapy. Powell claimed that the expertise developed by Hounsfield and his team, coupled with protection from patents, would give EMI three or four years, and maybe many more, to establish a solid market position. He argued that investments should be made quickly and boldly to maximize the market share of the EMI scanner before competitors entered. Other options, such as licensing, would impede the development of the scanner. If the licensees were the major Xray equipment suppliers, they might not promote the scanner aggressively since it would cannibalize their sales of X-ray equipment and consumables. Smaller companies would lack EMI’s sense of commitment and urgency. Besides, licensing would not provide EMI with the major strategic diversification it was seeking. It would be, in Powell’s words, â€Å"selling our birthright.† the proposed strategy Because the CT scanner incorporated a complex integration of some technologies in which EMI had only limited expertise, Powell proposed that the manufacturing strategy should rely heavily on outside sources of those components rather than trying to develop the expertise internally. This approach would not only minimize risk, but would also make it possible to implement a manufacturing program rapidly. He proposed the concept of developing various â€Å"centers of excellence† both inside and outside the company, making each responsible for the continued superiority of the subsystem it manufactured. For example, within the EMI UK organization a unit called SE Labs, which manufactured instruments and displays, would become the center of excellence for the scanner’s viewing console and display control. Pantak, an EMI unit with a capability in X-ray tube assembly, would become the center of excellence for the X-ray generation and detection subsystem. An outside vendor with which the company had worked in developing the scanner would be the center of excellence for data processing. Finally, a newly created division would be responsible for coordinating these subsystem manufacturers, integrating the various components, and assembling the final scanner at a company facility in the town of Hayes, not far from the CRL site. Powell emphasized that the low initial investment was possible because most of the components and subsystems were purchased from contractors and vendors. Even internal centers of excellence such as SE Labs and Pantak assembled their subsystems from purchased components. Overall, outside vendors accounted for 75–80 percent of the scanner’s manufacturing cost. Although Powell felt his arrangement greatly reduced EMI’s risk, the  £6 hostemostel.com million investment was a substantial one for the company, representing about half the funds available for capital investment over the coming year. (See exhibit 10.2 for a balance sheet and exhibit 10.3 for a projected funds flow.) The technology strategy was to keep CRL as the company’s center of excellence for design and software expertise, and to use the substantial profits Powell was projecting from even the earliest sales to maintain technological leadership position. Powell would personally head up a team to develop a marketing strategy. Clearly, the United States had to be the main focus of EMI’s marketing activity. Its neuroradiologists were regarded as world leaders and tended to welcome technological innovation. Furthermore, its  institutions were more commercial in their outlook than those in other countries and tended to have more available funds. Powell planned to set up a US sales subsidiary as soon as possible, recruiting sales and service personnel familiar with the North American healthcare market. Given the interest shown to date in the EMI scanner, he did not think there would be much difficulty in gaining the attention and interest of the medical community. Getting the $400,0 00 orders, however, would be more of a challenge. In simple terms, Powell’s sales strategy was to get machines into a few prestigious reference hospitals, then build from that base. the decision In March 1972 EMI’s chief executive, John Read, considered Powell’s proposal in preparation for a board meeting. Was this the diversification opportunity he had been hoping for? What were the risks? Could they be managed? How? If he decided to back the proposal, what kind of an implementation program would be necessary to ensure its eventual success? CASE B The year 1977 looked like it would be a very good one for EMI Medical Inc., a North American subsidiary of EMI Ltd. EMI’s CT scanner had met with enormous success in the American market. In the three years since the scanner’s introduction, EMI medical electronics sales had grown to  £42 million. Although this represented only 6 percent of total sales, this new business contributed pretax profits of  £12.5 million, almost 20 percent of the corporate total (exhibit 10.4). EMI Medical Inc. was thought to be responsible for about 80 percent of total scanner volume. And with an order backlog of more than 300 units, the future seemed rosy. Despite this formidable success, senior management in both the subsidiary and the parent company were concerned about several developments. First, this fast-growth field had attracted more than a dozen new entrants in the past two years, and technological advances were occurring rapidly. At the same time, the growing political debate ov er hospital cost containment often focused on $500,000 CT scanners as an example of questionable hospital spending. Finally, EMI was beginning to feel some internal organizational strains. Entry Decision  product launch Following months of debate among EMI’s top management, the decision to go ahead with the EMI Scanner project was assured when John Read, the company CEO, gave his support to Dr Powell’s proposal. In April 1972 a formal press announcement was greeted by a response that could only be described as overwhelming. EMI was flooded with inquiries from the medical and financial communities, and from most of the large diagnostic imaging companies wanting to license the technology, enter into joint ventures, or at least distribute the product. The response was that the company had decided to enter the business directly itself. Immediately action was implemented to put Dr Powell’s manufacturing strategy into operation. Manufacturing facilities were developed and supply contracts drawn up with the objective of beginning shipments within 12 months. In May, Godfrey Hounsfield, the brilliant EMI scientist who had developed the scanner, was dispatched to the US accompanied by a leading English neurologist. The American specialists with whom they spoke confirmed that the scanner had great medical importance. Interest was running high in the medical community. In December, EMI mounted a display at the annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America (RSNA). The exhibit was the highlight of the show, and boosted management’s confidence to establish a US sales company to penetrate the American medical market. us market entry In June 1973, with an impressive pile of sales leads and inquiries, a small sales office was established in Reston, Virginia, home of the newly appointed US sales branch manager, Mr Gus Pyber. Earlier that month the first North American head scanner had been installed at the prestigious Mayo Clinic, with a second machine promised to the Massachusetts General Hospital for trials. Interest was high, and the new sales force had little difficulty getting into the offices of leading radiologists and neurologists. By the end of the year, however, Mr Pyber had been fired in a dispute over appropriate expense levels, and James Gallagher, a former marketing manager with a major drug company, was hired to replace him. One of Gallagher’s first steps was to convince the company that the Chicago area was a far better location for the US office. It allowed better servicing of a national market, was a major center for medical electronics companies, and had more convenient linkages with London. This last point was important since all major strategic and policy decisions were being made directly by Dr Powell in London. During 1974, Gallagher concentrated on recruiting and developing his three-man sales force and two-man service organization. The cost of maintaining each salesman on the road was estimated at $50,000, while a serviceman’s salary and expenses at that time were around $35,000 annually. The production rate for the scanner was running at a rate of only three or four machines a month, and Gallagher saw little point in developing a huge sales force to sell a product for which supply was limited, and interest seemingly boundless. In this seller’s market the company developed some policies that were new to the industry. Most notably, they required that the customer deposit one-third of the purchase price with the order to guarantee a place in the production schedule. Sales leads and enquiries were followed up when the sales force could get to them, and the general attitude of the company seemed to have somewhat of a â€Å"take it or leave it† tone. It was in this period that EMI developed a reputation for arrogance in some parts of the medical profession. Nonetheless, by June 1974 the company had delivered 35 scanners at $390,000 each, and had another 60 orders in hand. Developing Challenges competitive challenge Toward the end of 1974, the first competitive scanners were announced. Unlike the EMI scanner, the new machines were designed to scan the body rather than the head. The Acta- Scanner had been developed at Georgetown University’s Medical Center and was manufactured by a small Maryland company called Digital Information Sciences  Corporation (DISCO). Technologically, it offered little advance over the EMI scanner except for one important feature. Its gantry design would accommodate a body rather than a head. While specifications on scan time and image composition were identical to those of the EMI scanner, the $298,000 price tag gave the Acta-Scanner a big advantage, particularly with smaller hospitals and private practitioners. The DeltaScan offered by Ohio Nuclear (ON) represented an even more formidable challenge. This head and body scanner had 256 ∞ 256 pixels compared with EMI’s 160 ∞ 160, and promised a 21/2-minute scan rather than the 41/2-minute scan time offered by EMI. ON offered these superior features on a unit priced $5,000 below the EMI scanner at $385,000. Many managers at EMI were surprised by the speed with which these products had appeared, barely two years after the EMI scanner was exhibited at the RSNA meeting in Chicago, and 18 months after the first machine was installed in the Mayo Clinic. The source of the challenge was also interesting. DISCO was a tiny private company, and ON contributed about 20 percent of its parent Technicare’s 1974 sales of $50 million. To some, the biggest surprise was how closely these competitive machines resembled EMI’s own scanner. The complex wall of patents had not provided a very enduring defense. ON tackled the issue directly in its 1975 annual report. After announcing that $882,200 had been spent in Technicare’s R&D Center to develop DeltaScan, the report stated: Patents have not played a significant role in the development of Ohio Nuclear’s product line, and it is not believed that the validity or invalidity of any patents known to exist is material to its current market position. However, the technologies on which its products are based are sufficiently complex and application of patent law sufficiently indefinite that this belief is not free from all doubt. The challenge represented by these new competitive products caused EMI to speed up the announcement of the body scanner Dr Hounsfield had been working on. The new CT 5000 model incorporated a second-generation technology in which multiple beams of radiation were shot at multiple detectors, rather  than the single pencil beam and the single detector of the original scanner (see exhibit 10.5). This technique allowed the gantry to rotate 10 ° rather than l ° after each translation, cutting scan time from 41/2 minutes to 20 seconds. In addition, the multiple-beam emission also permitted a finer image resolution by increasing the number of pixels from 160 ∞ 160 to 320 ∞ 320. Priced over $500,000, the CT 5000 received a standing ovation when Hounsfield demonstrated it at the radiological meetings held in Bermuda in May 1975. Despite EMI’s reassertion of its leadership position, aggressive competitive activity continued. In March 1975, Pfizer Inc., the $1.5 billion drug giant, announced it had acquired the manufacturing and marketing rights for the Acta-Scanner. EMI was then operating at an annual production rate of 150 units, and ON had announced plans to double capacity to 12 units per month by early 1976. Pfizer’s capacity plans were unknown. The most dramatic competitive revelation came at the annual RSNA meeting in December 1975, when six new competitors displayed CT scanners. Although none of the newcomers offered immediate delivery, all were booking orders with delivery dates up to 12 months out on the basis of their spec sheets and prototype or mock-up equipment exhibits. Some of the new entrants (Syntex, Artronix, and Neuroscan) were smaller companies, but others (General Electric, Picker, and Varian) were major medical electronics competitors. Perhaps most impressive was the General Electric CT/T scanner, which took the infant technology into its third generation (see exhibit 10.6). By using a 30 °-wide pulsed fan X-ray beam, the GE scanner could avoid the time-consuming â€Å"translate-rotate† sequence of the firstand second-generation scanners. A single continuous 360 ° sweep could be completed in 4.8 seconds, and the resulting image was reconstructed by the computer in a 320 ∞ 320 pixel matrix on a cathode ray tube. The unit was priced at $615,000. Clinical trials were scheduled for January, and shipment of production units was being quoted for mid-1976. The arrival of GE on the horizon signaled the beginning of a new competitive game. With a 300-person sales force and a service network of 1,200, GE clearly had marketing muscle. They had reputedly spent $15 million developing their third-generation scanner, and were continuing to spend at a rate of $5 million annually to keep ahead technologically. During 1975, one industry source estimated, about 150 new scanners were installed in the US, and more than twice as many orders entered. (Orders were firm, since most were secured with hefty front-end deposits.) Overall, orders were split fairly evenly between brain and body scanners. EMI was thought to have accounted for more than 50 percent of orders taken in 1975, ON for almost 30 percent. Market size and growth Accurate assessments of market size, growth rate, and competitors’ shares were difficult to obtain. The following represents a sample of the widely varying forecasts made in late 1975: †¢ Wall Street was clearly enamored with the industry prospects (Technicare’s stock price rose from 5 to 22 in six months) and analysts were predicting an annual market potential of $500 million to $1 billion by 1980. †¢ Frost and Sullivan, however, saw a US market of only $120 million by 1980, with ten years of cumulative sales only reaching $1 billion by 1984 (2,500  units at $400,000). †¢ Some leading radiologists suggested that CT scanners could be standard equipment in all short-term hospitals with 200 beds or more by 1985. †¢ Technicare’s president, Mr R. T. Grimm, forecast a worldwide market of over $700 million by 1980, of which $400 million would be in the US. †¢ Despite the technical limitations of its first-generation product, Pfizer said it expected to sell more than 1,500 units of its Acta-Scanner over the next five years. Within EMI, market forecasts had changed considerably. By late 1975, the estimate of the US market had been boosted to 350 units a year, of which EMI hoped to retain a 50 percent share. Management was acutely aware of the difficulty of forecasting in such a turbulent environment, however. international expansion New competitors also challenged EMI’s positions in markets outside the US. Siemens, the $7 billion West German company, became ON’s international distributor. The distribution agreement appeared to be one of short-term convenience for both parties, since Siemens acknowledged that it was developing its own CT scanner. Philips, too, had announced its intention to enter the field. Internationally, EMI had maintained its basic strategy of going direct to the national market rather than working through local partners or distributors. Although all European sales had originally been handled out of the UK office, it quickly became evident that local servicing staffs were required in most countries. Soon separate subsidiaries were established in most continental European countries, typically with a couple of salesmen, and three or four servicemen. Elsewhere in the world, salesmen were often attached to EMI’s existing music organization in that country (e.g., in South Africa, Australia, and Latin America). In Japan, however, EMI signed a distribution agreement with Toshiba which, in October 1975, submitted the largest single order to date: a request for 33 scanners. EMI in 1976: Strategy and Challenges emi’s situation in 1976 By 1976 the CT scanner business was evolving rapidly, but, as the results indicated, EMI had done extremely well financially (exhibit 10.5). In reviewing developments since the US market entry, the following was clear: †¢ While smaller competitors had challenged EMI somewhat earlier than might have been expected, none of the big diagnostic imaging companies had brought its scanner to market, even four years after the original EMI scanner announcement. †¢ While technology was evolving rapidly, the expertise of Hounsfield and his CRL group, and the aggressive reinvestment of much of the early profits in R&D, gave EMI a strong technological position. †¢ While market size and growth were highly uncertain, the potential was unquestionably much larger than EMI had forecast in their early plans. †¢ In all, EMI was well established, with a strong and growing sales volume and a good technical reputation. The company was unquestionably the industry leader. Nonetheless, in the light of all the developments, the strategic tasks facing EMI in 1976 differed considerably from those of earlier years. The following paragraphs outline the most important challenges and problems facing the company in this period. strategic priorities EMI’s first sales priority was to protect its existing highly visible and prestigious customer base from competitors. When its second-generation scanner was introduced in mid-1975, EMI promised to upgrade without charge the first-generation equipment already purchased by its established customers. Although each of these 120 upgrades was estimated to cost EMI $60,000 in components and installation costs, the US sales organization felt that the expense was essential to maintain the confidence and good faith of this important core group of customers. To maintain its leadership image, the US company also expanded its service organization substantially. Beginning in early 1976, new regional and district sales and service offices were opened with the objective of providing customers with the best service  in the industry. A typical annual service contract cost the hospital $40,000 per scanner. By year’s end, the company boasted 20 service centers with 150 service engineers – a ratio that represented one serviceman for every two or three machines installed. The sales force by this time had grown to 20, and was much more customer oriented. Another important task was to improve delivery performance. The interval between order and promised delivery had been lengthening; at the same time, promised delivery dates were often missed. By late 1975, it was not unusual for a 6-month promise to convert into a 12- or 15month actual delivery time. Fortunately for EMI, all CT manufacturers were in backorder and were offering extended delivery dates. However, EMI’s poor performance in meeting promised dates was hurting its reputation. The company responded by substantially expanding its production facilities. By mid-1976 there were six manufacturing locations in the UK, yet because of continuing problems with component suppliers, combined capacity for head and body scanners was estimated at less than 20 units a month. Organizational and personnel issues As the US sales organization became increasingly frustrated, they began urging top management to manufacture scanners in North America. Believing that the product had reached the necessary level of maturity, Dr Powell judged that the time was ripe to establish a US plant to handle at least final assembly and test operations. A Northbrook, Illinois site was chosen. Powell had become EMI’s managing director and was more determined than ever to make the new medical electronics business a success. A capable manager was desperately needed to head the business, particularly in view of the rapid developments in the critical North American market. Consequently, Powell was delighted when Normand Provost, who had been his boss at Texas Instruments, contacted him at the Bermuda radiological meeting in March 1975. He was hired with the hope that he could build a stronger, more integrated US company. With the Northbrook plant scheduled to begin operations by mid-1976, Normand Provost began hiring skilled production personnel. A Northbrook product development center was also a vision of Provost’s to allow EMI to draw on US technical expertise and experience in  solid state electronics and data processing, and the company began seeking people with strong technological and scientific backgrounds. Having hired Provost, Dr Powell made several important organizational changes aimed at facilitating the medical electronics business’s growth and development. In the UK, he announced the creation of a separate medical electronics group. This allowed the separate operating companies, EMI Medical Ltd (previously known as the X-Ray Systems Division), Pantak (EMI) Ltd, SE Labs (EMI) Lt., and EMI Meterflow Ltd, to be grouped together under a single group executive, John Willsher. (See exhibit 10.6.) At last, a more integrated scanner business seemed to be emerging organizationally. The US sales subsidiary was folded into a new company, EMI Medical Inc., but continued to operate as a separate entity. The intention was to develop this company as an integrated diversified medical electronics operation. Jim Gallagher, the general manager of the US operations, was fired and Bob Hagglund became president of EMI Medical Inc. While Gallagher had been an effective salesman, Powell thought the company needed a more rounded general manager in its next phase of expansion. Hagglund, previously executive vice president of G.D. Searle’s diagnostic business, seemed to have the broader background and outlook required to manage a larger integrated operation. He reported through Provost back to Dr Powell in the UK. While Provost’s initial assignment was to establish the new manufacturing and research facilities in the US, it was widely assumed within EMI that he was being groomed to take responsibility for the company’s medical electronics businesses worldwid e. However, in April 1976, while visiting London to discuss progress, Provost died of a heart attack. As a result, the US and UK organizations reported separately to Dr Powell. product diversification Since EMI wished to use the scanner as a means to become a major force in medical electronics, Powell argued that some bold external moves were needed to protect the company’s leadership position. In March 1976, EMI acquired for $2 million ( £1.1 million) SHM Nuclear Corporation, a California-based company that had developed linear accelerators for cancer therapy and  computerized radiotherapy planning systems. Although the SHM product line needed substantial further development, the hope was that linking such systems to the CT scanner would permit a synchronized location and treatment of cancer. Six months later EMI paid  £6.5 million to acquire an additional 60 percent of Nuclear Enterprises Ltd, an Edinburgh-based supplier of ultrasound equipment. In the 1976 annual report, Sir John Read, now EMI’s chairman, reaffirmed his support for Dr Powell’s strategy: We have every reason to believe that this new grouping of scientific and technological resources will prove of national benefit in securing a growing share of worldwide markets for high-technology products†¦ Future Prospects At the close of 1976, EMI’s medical electronics business was exceeding all expectations. In just three years, sales of electronics products had risen from  £84 million to  £207 million; a large part of this increase was due to the scanner. Even more impressive, profits of the electronics line had risen from  £5.2 million in 1972/73 to  £26.4 million in 1975/76, jumping from 16 to 40 percent of the corporate total. Rather than dwindling, interest in scanners seemed to be increasing. Although the company had sold around 450 scanners over the past three years (over 300 in the US alone), its order backlog was estimated to be 300 units. At the December 1976 RSNA meeting, 120 of the 280 papers presented were related to CT scanning. As he reviewed the medical electronics business he had built, Dr Powell was generally pleased with the way in which the company had met the challenges of being a pioneer in a new industry segment. However, there were several developments that he felt would need considerable attention over the next few years. First, Powell felt that competitive activity would continue to present a challenge; second, some changes in the US regulatory environment concerned him; and finally, he was aware that the recent organization changes had created some strains. competitive problems By the end of 1976, EMI had delivered 450 of the 650-odd scanners installed worldwide, yet its market share had dropped to 56 percent in 1975/76 (198 of 352 scanners sold that June-to-June period were EMI’s). The company gained some consolation from the fact that despite their premium pricing strategy and their delivery problems, they had conceded less than half the total market to the combined competitive field. They also felt some sense of security in the 300 orders they held awaiting delivery. Nonetheless, Sir John Read was clearly concerned: [We are well aware of the developing competition. Our research program is being fully sustained to ensure our continued leadership†¦ In mid-1976, the company announced its intention â€Å"to protect its inventions and assert its patent strength,† and subsequently filed suit against Ohio Nuclear claiming patent infringement. However, at the same time, EMI issued a statement proclaiming that â€Å"it was the company’s wish to make its pioneering scanner patents available to all under suitable licensing arrangements.† At the annual RSNA meeting in December 1976, sixteen competitors exhibited scanners. The year’s new entrants (including CGR, the French X-ray giant; Hitachi from Japan; and G.D. Searle, the US drug and hospital equipment company) were not yet making deliveries, however. The industry’s potential production capacity was now estimated to be over 900 units annually. GE’s much-publicized entry was already six months behind their announced delivery date, but it was strongly rumored that production shipments of GE’s third-generation scanner were about to begin. EMI Medical Inc. awaited that event with some trepidation. (A summary of major competitors and their situations as of 1976 is presented in table 10.2.) Regulatory problems By mid-1976 there were indications that government might try to exert a tighter control over hospital spending in general, and purchase of CT scanners in particular. The rapidly escalating cost of healthcare had been a political issue for years, and the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 required states to control the development of costly  or unnecessary health services through a mechanism known as the Certificate of Need (CON) procedure. If they wished to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursements, healthcare facilities were required to submit documentation to their state’s department of health to justify major capital expenditures (typically in excess of $100,000). Before 1976, the CON procedures had generally been merely an administrative impediment to the process of selling a scanner, delaying but not preventing the authorization of funds. However, by 1976, the cost of medical care represented 8 percent of the gross national product and Jimmy Carter made control of the â€Å"skyrocketing costs of healthcare† a major campaign issue. One of the most frequently cited examples of waste was the proliferation of CT scanners. It was argued that this $500,000 device had become a symbol of prestige and sophistication in the medical community, so that every institution wanted its own scanner, even if a neighboring facility had one that was grossly underutilized. In response to heightened public awareness of the issue, five states declared a moratorium on the purchase of new scanners, including California, which had accounted for over 20 percent of total US scanner placements to date. In November, Jimmy Carter was elected president. organizational problems Perhaps most troublesome to Dr Powell were the organizational problems. Tensions within the EMI organization had been developing for some time, centering on the issues of manufacturing and product design. Managers in the US company felt that they had little control over manufacturing schedules and little input into product design, despite the fact that they were responsible for 80 percent of corporate scanner sales. In their view, the company’s current market position was being eroded by the worsening manufacturing delivery performance from the UK, while its longer-term prospects were threatened by the competitive challenges to EMI’s technological leadership. Although the Northbrook plant had been completed in late 1976, US managers were still not satisfied they had the necessary control over production. Arguing that the quality of subassemblies and components shipped from the UK was deteriorating and delivery promises were becoming even more unreliable,  they began investigating alternate supply sources in the US. UK-based manufacturing managers felt that much of the responsibility for backlogs lay with the product engineers and the sales organizations. Their unreliable sales forecasts and constantly changing design specifications had severely disrupted production schedules. The worst bottlenecks involved outside suppliers and subcontractors that were unable to gear up and down overnight. Complete systems could be held up for weeks or months awaiting a single simple component. As the Northbrook plant became increasingly independent, US managers sensed that the UK plants felt less responsibility for them. In tight supply situations they felt there was a tendency to ship to European or other export customers first. Some US managers also believed that components were increasingly shipped from UK plants without the same rigid final checks they normally received. The assumption was that the US could do their own QC checking, it was asserted. Both these assertions were strongly denied by the English group. Nonetheless, Bob Hagglund soon began urging Dr Powell to let EMI Medical Inc. become a more independent manufacturing operation rather than simply a final assembly plant for UK components. This prospect disturbed John Willsher, managing director of EMI Medical Ltd,  who argued that dividing manufacturing operations could mean duplicating overhead and spreading existing expertise too thin. Others felt that the â€Å"bootleg development† of alternate supply sources showed a disrespect for the â€Å"center of excellence† concept, and could easily compromise the ability of Pantak (X-ray technology) and SE Labs (displays) to remain at the forefront of technology. Product development issues also created some organizational tension. The US sales organization knew that GE’s impressive new third-generation â€Å"fan beam† scanner would soon be ready for delivery, and found customers hesitant to commit to EMI’s new CT 5005 until the GE product came out. For months telexes had been flowing from Northbrook to EMI’s Central Research Laboratories asking if drastic reductions in scan time might be possible to meet the GE threat. Meanwhile, scientists at CRL felt that US CT competition was developing into a specifications war based on the wrong issue, scan time. Shorter elapsed times meant less image blurring, but in the trade-off between scan time and picture resolution, EMI engineers had preferred to concentrate on better-quality images. They felt that the 20-second scan offered by EMI scanners made practical sense since a patient could typically hold his breath that long while being diagnosed. CRL staff were exploring some entirely new imaging concepts and hoped to have a completely new scanning technology ready to market in three or four years. Dr Hounsfield had conducted experiments with the fan beam concept in the early 1970s and was skeptical of its ability to produce good-quality images. To use sodium iodide detectors similar to those in existing scanners would be cost prohibitive in the large numbers necessary to pick up a broad scan; to use other materials such as xenon gas would lead to quality and stability problems, in Hounsfield’s view. Since GE and others offering third-generation equipment had not yet delivered commercial machines, he felt little incentive to redirect his staff to these areas already researched and rejected. There were many other demands on the time and attention of Hounsfield and his staff, all of which seemed important for the company. They were in constant demand by technicians to deal with major problems that arose that nobody else could solve. Sales people wanted him to talk to their largest and most prestigious customers, since a visit by Dr Hounsfield could often swing an important sale. They were also involved in internal training on all new products. The scientific community wanted them to present papers and give lectures. And increasingly, Dr Hounsfield found himself in a public relations role as he accepted honors from all over the globe. The impact was to greatly enhance EMI’s reputation and to reinforce its image as the leader in the field. When it appeared that CRL was unwilling or unable to make the product changes  the US organization felt it needed, Hagglund made the bold proposal that the newly established research laboratories in Northbrook take responsibility for developing a three- to five-second-scan â€Å"fan beam†-type scanner. Dr Powell agreed to study the suggestion, but was finding it difficult to evaluate the relative merits of the US subsidiary’s views and the CRL scientists’ opinions. By year’s end, Dr Powell had still been unable to find anybody to take charge of the worldwide medical electronics business. By default, the main decision-making forum became the Medical Group Review Committee (MGRC), a group of key line and staff managers which met, monthly at first, to help establish and review strategic decisions. Among the issues discussed by this committee were the manufacturing and product development decisions that had produced tensions between the US and UK managers. P owell had hoped that the MGRC would help build communications and consensus among his managers, but it soon became evident that this goal was unrealistic. In the words of one manager close to the events: The problem was there was no mutual respect between managers with similar responsibilities. Medical Ltd was resentful of Medical Inc.’s push for greater independence, and were not going to go out of their way to help the Americans succeed. As the business grew larger and more complex, Dr Powell’s ability to act both as corporate CEO and head of the worldwide medical business diminished. Increasingly, he was forced to rely on the MGRC to address operating problems as well as strategic issues. The coordination problem became so complex that, by early 1977, there were four subcommittees of the MGRC, each with representatives of the US and UK organizations, and each meeting monthly on one side of the Atlantic or the other. Committees included Manufacturing and Operations, Product Planning and Resources, Marketing and Sales Programs, and Service and Spares. powell’s problems As the new year opened, Dr Powell reviewed EMI’s medical electronics business. How well was it positioned? Where were the major threats and opportunities? What were the key issues he should deal with in 1977? Which should he tackle first, and how? These were the issues he turned over in his  mind as he prepared to note down his plans for 1977. Assistant Professor Christopher A. Bartlett prepared this case as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Information was obtained from public sources and third parties. Although employees of the subject company discussed with the researcher events referred to in the case, they did not participate in the preparation of the document. The analysis, conclusions, and opinions stated do not necessarily represent those of the company, its employees or agents, or employees or agents of its subsidiaries. Thorn EMI PLC, on its own behalf and on behalf of all or any of its present or former subsidiaries, disclaims any responsibility for the matters included or referred to in the study.

Answer questions Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 9

Answer questions - Essay Example No One Knows". This article argues that the US should have a national database that tracks and reports police shootings because the US government tracks practically everything else, including the number of shark attacks on humans (Lowery 1). Finally, the essay will also rely on the Bureau of Justice Statistics website, which tracks and reports arrest-related deaths. The topic of interest for the proposed essay involves censorship over the lack of reporting regarding police shootings. A similar issue occurred at Syracuse University, where a sit-in protest by students over the administrations policy was covered by the corporate media but not in its entirety. The general Body of the Syracuse University, which brings together various student bodies from the university, had organized a sit-in protest against the new university Chancellors "Fast Forward" Program (dailycensored.com 1). This program sought to close the universitys advocacy centre, which caters for the needs of students victimized by sexual abuse, while also reducing the number of staff in the psychiatry unit in order to implement cuts in the number of staff. However, although this protest was covered in various media sources, including the Chronicle of Higher Education, the Huffington Post, U.S.A. Today, Democracy Now, these media sources censored the real reason for the protests, inst ead giving coverage to general issues. Probably the biggest reason why most media sources failed to cover the real reason for the protests was due to the fact that major corporations were involved in closing the advocacy centre, as well as the departure of psychiatry staff from the university. Two major organizations are identified, which are Sassaki Associates and Bain and Company (dailycensored.com 1). Both agencies are interested in taking over the advocacy centres operations, in which Sassaki Associates is to be involved in planning and revitalization in partnership with the

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Economic of Ocean Resources - Assignment Example This thus makes the management and conservation of the international public good vital to both those bordering the water bodies and those who do not, failure to conserve the water bodies effectively has myriad economic ramifications as portrayed in the discussion below. Ineffective management of oceans refers to the lack of effective administrative policies to regulate the use of the international public good thus permitting everyone to use the ocean as they wish. Among the numerous uses of oceans include navigation thus transportation of goods, sports and tourism among many others. While the ocean offers such primary services to the people, they constitute part of the global ecosystems often surviving numerous species of aquatic wildlife (Erwin, Cornelis and Timothy 5). Failing to manage the ecosystem thus permits those who use the resource to pollute the waters while those engaging in fishing to overfish even some of the endangered species in such ecosystems. The consequences of a polluted ocean are dire. These affect every citizen of the globe despite their relationship with such water bodies owing to the production of impure public goods. As a public good, the consumption of the oceans requires the ocean to remain pure and conducive. This implies that the governments that border the water bodies must formulate effective policies that govern the use of the ocean often safeguarding the interests of the natural ecosystems found in the oceans. Among the major factors that pollute the water, include oil spillage and garbage management. The large oil tankers among other vessels that use the ocean must ensure effective and considerate use of the resource in order to curb instances of spilling oil among other types of impurities into the oceans. Additionally, industrial cities situated strategically along the water bodies must manage their wastes effectively in order to curb dumping of industrial refuse into the ocean.  Ã‚  

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Choosing an Office - Essay Example ns to find one that reflects the true preference, for example, the cost of the office might be very conducive, but the accompanying distance is very high. The two scoring options that were dominated became better in the swing preference table because of the weights assigned to each alternative. The outcomes of the different alternatives change according to the relative position of the alternative on the preference table. For example, the weight for size is 3, therefore, a preference with a high figure for size would benefit more. In this case, Baranov has a preference score of 0 for size while Parkway has a preference score of 90. Therefore, this implies that a preference score in one factor severely affects the preference score in another factor. The swing weights method is easier to explain to a client because the client will be able to see the differences in weights and their assignment. This means that a client will understand why each alternative is being assigned the weight it is assigned, and why the outcomes come out in a specific manner. This choice is also effective if the choices are way more than the ones in this case. For example, if Alan had 40 sites to evaluate, using the even swaps method would take a lot of time and confuse the client. Therefore, it is advisable to use the swing weights

Making Connection between Black and White, Changing America and Civil Essay

Making Connection between Black and White, Changing America and Civil Disobidience - Essay Example These authors commonly discuss the problems of American society such as racial divide, immigrant problems, and assimilation of the people of other races into the mainstream white society. Though Goodale’s and Swerdlow’s approach to the problems of American society are more descriptive than prescriptive, Thoreau’s approach is quite prescriptive. He suggests that people of American society seem to be affected with a racial, cultural, political and religious identity confusion. Yet an American’s national identity is composed of a diverse but uniquely uniformed nationality including all of the contradictions. While the uniformity of the American nationality is ensured by a geographical unity, America is a heterogeneous society that contains diverse races, cultures, nationalities, religions, etc. Still American heterogeneous nationality is affected with a number of complexities. In her article, â€Å"Black and White†, Gloria Goodale addresses this racial divide within the heart of American society, whereas Joel Swerdlow, the author of â€Å"Changing America† depicts the changes that America’s racial identity has undergone and still is undergoing. On the other hand, though Henry David Thoreau’s â€Å"Civil Disobedience† deals with the sort of political protest an American should adopt in order to dissent what he or she does not support or think right. Though apparently Thoreau’s proposition â€Å"to withdraw from an evil† relates much to a man’s, especially an American’s, political life, such stance can help dispensing the racial divide in the American society.

The library research essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 1

The library research - Essay Example Considering the ages that play video games, teenagers are worst affected in terms of time taken, and research has shown that most of the teenagers take about average of 4-5 hours a day; thus, in most cases, the parents dislike video games since they are considered the facilitating factor for laziness on children. Video games are addictive just like drugs do, it makes those addicted especially the teenagers to abscond most of the important activities in the day, without guidance, it can destructive but can be beneficial to the players if considered carefully. There is a significant contribution of spatial reasoning in education, and there is a connection between those children that are good in spatial reasoning and there performance in IQ tests. In this regard, those children who have good spatial skills do excel in geometry and demonstrates good mental manipulation and navigation skills. In terms of gender, girls are considered not to easily adapt to spatial reasoning growth compared to boys, improvement of spatial reasoning is enhanced by playing video games, in this case, the skills required to play the game that also involves manipulation and anticipation of the objects, which eventually improves the skills of spatial reasoning (Anderson, Douglas, and Katherine 45). Furthermore, there is a special skill acquired through critical thinking, with critical thinking, one is able to master concepts rather than just memorize those concepts. Critical thinking is very important in making insights in technical subjects like engineering, math, science, and even humanities, in the playing of the video games, there are novels of problems that are presented to the person playing the game and needs a split of a second to solve (Anderson, Douglas, and Katherine 49). In this case, the gamers will have to learn how to think quickly and in several ways within a short time, the same speedy solution to a problem by provision of many options is transferred to other real life situ ation and the teenagers that play such video games have high chances of sharpening the critical thinking. In addition, the fact that video games are designed to be more realistic and the concern that it might increase violent activities is not true, as most of the video games today have been used to pass specific knowledge and have dominated teaching in institution. Simulation using video games are today used in surgery schools and can pass important information to the teenager who wants to acquire specific skills like surgery. There is also a sense of rehabilitation that comes with video game playing, for instance, there is a 13-year-old boy who suffered Erb’s palsy noticed remarkable improvement on how to control his arms after video games play (Bissell 32). Additionally, there is a false stereotype that is given to those who play video games, they are described as those who are antisocial and cannot lose an eye off the screen, this position is not true because the contempo rary video games are designed in a way that it helps in solving problem and complete tasks. There is the sense of building social skills especially those who are introverted; they get a solace from the video games that provide a stress free way for social interaction

Is capitalism sustainable Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Is capitalism sustainable - Essay Example Thus reduction in these capitals will lead to destruction of the human capital. Contributions of capitalism to the society depend on their profit and growth. Thus the existence of capitalism also leads to reduction in human and social capital. With the increasing cost of production and diminishing social values the sustainability of capitalism is reduced. (Heslam 2002). The growth model used by the capitalism seems to be uncertain due to its dependence on depleting natural resources. Rapid decline in natural capital will be a challenge to the economic capital. Climate crisis, income disparity, and scarcity of financial and social; resources in the global economy are affecting the sustainability of capitalism. Capitalism has helped the development of financial system in countries through increased income from investment and employment opportunity to the society. Thus the existence of capitalism is necessary for improvement in society. Sustainability of any system depends on the energy procured by it. Without energy, sustainability becomes impossible. Capitalism acquires its energy from the environment through extraction. But it does not provide consideration for restoring the energy extracted by it. This makes energy reduction in the environment. It is termed as physical entropy. Capitalism is based on the concept of profit. Without economic benefit, no restoration of energy takes place. Future generations' benefits are not the mission of capitalism. It insists on making profit with the resources in the environment. It undertakes only financially profitable activities. Reduction of wastes and pollution carried out by firms depends on the profitability from that process. Individual's self interest is only considered in capitalism. Energy renewal is carried out to support current consumption and restoring of energy for future generations is not considered. Thus, capitalism inescapably dislocates social energy throu gh weakening the personal relationships in society. In order to ensure maximum economic efficiency, impartial and impersonal relationship between people is necessary. For efficient functioning of market economies, competency instead of cooperation is required. In a more productive business environment social relationship gets less time and energy. In a price based marketing there is no place for trust and personal relationship. It reduces the personal relationship in the society. It is termed as disorganization of social energy through devaluation of personal relationships. In capitalism resources from the society are used for making profit. However, there is no consideration for restoring the social capital which is essential for maintaining effective personal relationships in the society. Investment in the society for the benefit of future generation does not provide any economic incentives for the business capital. Relationship in the capitalistic society depends on its financial benefit for them. Investment in social capital is tr eated as waste of resources in capitalism In an economy people exchange their resources with other people for mutual benefit. Transformation of physical energy in raw materials with the help of social energy in human resources is carried on in capitalism. It is exchange on the basis of profit. Economic capital takes out energy from natural and social capital. Social and

For patients in a home setting with wounds, does use of tap water to Research Proposal

For patients in a home setting with wounds, does use of tap water to cleanse wound affect rate of infection and healing compared to use of normal saline to cleanse wounds in a month period - Research Proposal Example Presently, this process has an initial integrated into the patients’ healthcare plan as opposed to previously when its application was because of an infection. Since the process was officially under inauguration, it has undergone several alterations that aid the science transferred to the bedside to aid in the healing intervention. The process use an acronym (TIME) which stands for tissue management, infection and inflammation, moisture control and balance and the final step is epithelial advancement. This process advances the art of wound healing without deviating from the base principles of moisture control, debridement and bacterial control. This framework is not a continuum and therefore is applicable in a large number of wounds (Fleisher & Ludwig, 2010). This framework is only applicable if the level of intervention is as thorough as the level of the assessment following it. The assessment helps identify how the wound is affecting the individual, cause of the wound and the effects of the individual on the wound. This aids in the determination of the healing process happening and the appropriate way to manage the wound. This process is also essential as the nurse in charge needs to collect data on how the wound’s management. The first step is debridement, which is a practice on empirical observation. Although this method has no proof of expediting healing, it is a clinical advice since it helps in striking a balance in the wound’s bio burden. After a wound, the body produces hormones and body enzymes form a corrosive compound on the surface of the wound. The control to this is simply making sure that a moisture balance is in place. Dressing and elevating it helps in minimizing this exudate therefore giving the wound an atmosphere for healing (Kifer, 2012). The most important step in wound healing, is balancing the bacteria on the wound. A wound contains microorganisms and tissue debris and this can delay healing. Pathogens

Culture report Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Culture report - Essay Example The students that attend this high school have many obstacles to overcome in their lives. The reservation is a place of high poverty, high unemployment and high rates of substance abuse. It is the type of environment that keeps people from succeeding in life. Yet, this remarkable high school basketball team seems to find a way to win every year. They have won five state championships against much larger, well-funded schools. One of the secrets to the success of the team is their dedicated coach Al Redman. The movie focuses on Beaver C’Bearing and the work he and his coach put into winning. It shows that the boys on the team succeed by working hard to hone their skills and by working together. The movie shows that unfortunately, the lessons learned on the basketball court often do not translate to life on the reservation. Much of the conversation in the movie centers on players that were once great but have failed to have successful lives. II. Relevance of the movie CHIEFS to M arketing There is a lot of relevance in the movie CHIEFS to cross cultural marketing. One of the aspects of culture that was displayed in this movie of Native American culture seems to be the aspect of a focus on shared ownership of public goods. The Chiefs basketball team belongs to the reservation. It occurs to me that this is truer for this community of Native Americans than it is for the typical American community with a more Euro-centric culture. The Chiefs literally belong to the community, no one person or group has more of an interest in them than anyone else does. That is why everyone leaves the reservation to go see the Chiefs play their games in the playoffs. What this means for marketing is that any attempt to market the mystique, culture or logo of the Chiefs would have to be done in a way that benefits the entire community. If any one single individual or group were to try to monopolize access or attempt to brand the Chiefs in a way that excluded the community at large , I believe that this person would have a difficult time succeeding. This team is truly the heart and the soul of the Wind River Reservation in some ways. It is more than a source of pride, it is a public good, and therefore the public will have to be supportive of any marketing efforts involving the team. III. Personal Reaction to the viewing of the movie CHIEFS. I really enjoyed the movie and the crowd that had gathered to watch the movie. I really got caught-up in the stories of these basketball players and how difficult their lives were. I never felt sorry for them, because they seemed so determined to succeed at basketball. I felt that the writer and director of the film did a great job depicting the challenges Beaver C’Bearing and his teammates faced, without sensationalizing the challenges they face off the court. At times, the movie was sad, but always made me feel as though in the end the people on the team would somehow, against all the odd succeed in life and in th e game of basketball. I could not help pull for the team in each one of their games, even though the players were flawed and imperfect people. Right to the end of the movie, I believed that these people were going to win. I wanted them to win because it appears as though they were dealt such an unfair hand by fate and by their circumstances. However, I liked the fact that the

The Giver by Lois Lowry Essay Example for Free

The Giver by Lois Lowry Essay Using specific examples from the book compare and contrast Jonas world with your world.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Jonas lives in a peaceful and structured community where people follow rules and instructions without hesitation (p.1). Most instructions and reprimands are transmitted over the loudspeakers that are placed around the community (pp.2, 22-23, 37). In Jonas world, children are born to Birthmothers (pp. 21, 53) and are raised in the nurturing center with other newborn infants. Children are given a name and a number and are assigned to couples (p. 13) who are only allowed to have two children, a male and a female (p.8). Underweight infants (pp.148-150), maladaptive citizens (p.7), people who break rules (pp.2 and 9) and the elderly people (pp.7, 28, 31-32) are released from the society. Children are well behaved and they are not allowed to ride the bicycle until they turn nine (p.13). From eight to eleven years of age, children are required to do volunteer work (pp.26 and 45) and at twelve, they are given their assignments or careers as new adult members of the community (pp.53-60). People in the community cannot see colors (p.95) nor feel pains (p.110) and love (p.126-127) because they chose sameness (p.95). In our world, we have the liberty to choose our professions and our spouses. Parents nurture and give birth to their own children. Couples can have as much children as they want. We are open to diversity and we accept individual differences. The law in our society does not permit the practice of euthanasia on children with congenital abnormalities as well as the elderly people. Although we are governed by laws, we are not expected to behave in a structured manner. Most people have the capability to see the colors of our environment, to experience joy, sadness, love and pain. How does the author Lowry use imagery to describe snow and war?   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   In describing the snow, Lois Lowry use imagery that relates to the visual, tactile and kinesthetic sensation of the body, e.g. sight of a bright, whirling torrent of crystals in the air (p.81), feeling of cold air and snowflakes on Jonas skin and tongue (p.80-81, 92), and the sensation of going downhill on a sled (pp.81-82, 92). Since Jonas has received so many memories in the past, he was asked to share the painful memory of war that was too much for the Giver to endure (p.118). The imagery used by Lowry in describing war is more detailed. The images appeal to our five senses the sight of several groaning men on the field (p118), a boy in uniform glistering with wet, fresh blood (p.119) and witnessing men and animals die (p.120); the scent of the foul-smelling place (p.118); the sense of hearing the thud of cannons and people begging for water (p.119-120); and the sense of touch or feeling as Jonas hold the metal container of water and feel the excruciating pain in his arm (p.119).

Assessing The Scope Of Competitive Rivalry

Assessing The Scope Of Competitive Rivalry Scope of competitive rivalry mainly deals with a global focus, however, local computer makers should also be considered. For the large corporations, having a presence in foreign markets is essential. Companies like Dell, HP, Lenovo/IBM, and Acer all compete in multiple international markets. If individuals in a particular country are capable of buying a PC, the top competitors all fight for their purchases. Competition is not cut throat per-se, but if a company like HP falters in any one of its multiple segments, Dell could come in and take its market share. Stage in Industry Life Cycle The thing about technology is that it constantly changes. The personal computer, servers, printers, and data storage devices have existed for decades, but constant RD is employed to make these high-tech machines smaller, run faster, and operate more efficiently. Computers and their peripherals will likely remain in the growth stage for a very long time. Though growth has slowed in developed countries like the United States, it has increased in other developing countries like Brazil, India, and China. On that note, the idea itself has reached maturity. For example, servers (as well as personal computers) can offer long usage time if they are properly serviced over the years. Computers configured four years ago, if built with quality high-end components, can still compete with ones coming out today. New technologies make adding performance to personal computers and servers effortless, which furthers the life of the machines. Degree of Vertical Integration According to Thompson and Gambles research, There were too many technologies and manufacturing intricacies to master for a vertically integrated manufacturer to keep its products on the cutting edge. Therefore, the industry has a very low degree of vertical integration. Companies search for the best manufacturers of parts and services and combine them to create a name-brand computer. Providers need to be accessible for when they are demanded. If they fail, companies like Dell and HP can switch as quickly as living creatures blink. Ease of Entry/Exit Because the industry has long been established and defined by the current competition, ease of entry/exit is not exactly easy. In fact, it would be nearly impossible for a start-up firm to enter. A long established company like Sony, for example, was able to enter late in the game because of their existing company structure and size. Only already established large companies would be able to enter the market, unless some entrepreneur discovered a way to enhance existing business models which maximized efficiencies in nearly every aspect of the venture. Technology Innovation The industry is highly characterized by innovation, considering it is nothing but technology. New products are constantly developed, daily in fact. Intel, for example, releases computer processing units (CPUs) every three months. As a result, costs decline .5% weekly. These CPUs are among the main components of the computer. Since technology is evolving at a rapid rate, computer companies always look for ways to reduce inventory carryover while still having enough in inventory if demand spikes. Product Characteristics Defining the product characteristics is rather complex, as not only are the computers intricate in nature, but the number of products associated with this industry colossal. Looking at the main composition, the industry includes computers (servers, desktops, laptops), peripherals associated with the computer like wireless routers and printers, and external storage. Focusing on the computers and depending on the price, they vary in terms of processing speed, hard drive capacity, number of video display outputs, number of channels of surround sound, and amount of random access memory. Economies of Scale As with most industries, the name of the game is getting the best products for the best price. Gray areas do exist, however. CPUs for personal computers, for example, are only made by two competitors (AMD and Intel). Other manufacturers like SIS and Centaur exist, though they are not as well known and certainly not trusted enough to be in name brand PCs. The same goes for video cards. Many manufacturers do exist, but there are only two significant competitors in the market (Nvidia and ATI). Most manufacturers of video cards actually incorporate the chipsets of the two top competitors into their own models. There is a substantial amount of marketing and advertising that goes into the products of the top competitors. The public must be constantly reminded which computers are the best to buy. Because of cost cutting (as well as international expansion), many companies have some, if not the majority, of their processes outsourced. To further reduce costs, inventory carryover is kept low. Learning and Experience Curve Effects The industry is highly characterized by the philosophy of learn by doing. For example, Dell has been improving efficiencies in their business model for the past eighteen and a half years (as of 2008). As a result, they are a leader in many aspects of their value chain. The competition follows suit, but they do not have as much experience as Dell does in this instance. Capacity Utilization Once again, as with all industries, it is important to have high capacity utilization in order to maximize efficiencies. Because there is little markup on computers and their components, companies need to squeeze savings out of every aspect of their operations. Industry Profitability If a company is well managed and knows what its customers want, then industry profitability can be high. Once processes begin to fall short or crumble, company profitability can go from black to red in a short amount of time. Compaq (before it became HP) was an example of a company with poor management structure. Executives ran the company into the ground because they were not finding ways to be profitable. Despite holding a large portion of market share, the company operated in the red for many of its quarters. Industry Driving Forces Though the industry possesses many driving forces, three come to mind as being most prevalent. For one, increasing globalization plays a big role in analyzing company size and strength. Outsourcing processes to many different countries leads to cheaper manufacturing costs across the entire value chain. India, for example, is a common location for technical support call centers. As the world grows smaller, having a well established brand name in multiple markets will keep top competitors successful. A second driving force is the diffusion of technical know-how across more companies and more countries. Just like in increasing globalization, outsourcing helps to locate the best RD opportunities in the least expensive country. The more minds there are on a project, the more opportunities there are for innovation. As a result, emerging countries may have different thought processes and needs compared to developed economies, so new ideas may be generated. A third driving force is changes in cost and efficiency. As mentioned earlier, it is imperative for companies in this industry to master the Just in Time strategy. Computer components are decreasing in price weekly and are becoming more energy efficient. These changes ultimately lead to newer and better products than those of three months ago. Key Success Factors Just like the driving forces, there are many key success factors that relate to this industry. For one, top competitors most certainly have an expertise in a particular technology or specific research (in this case, computer designing). They hand select the best components (or cheapest depending on the business model) for customers to choose from. After all, the quality of components defines the quality of the computer. A second key success factor is the proven ability to improve production processes. This includes the aforementioned industry-wide decrease in days of inventory holdings, and lessening vertical integration improves competitiveness. As computer components become cheaper to manufacture, the prices decrease. As a result, computer prices fall. Improving production processes are effective methods of keeping profitability high. A third key success factor is quality control know-how. No matter what the problem is with ones computer, it is always the fault of the manufacturer. If HP or Dell builds unreliable computers, buyers will simply switch to another brand with little hesitation. Therefore, it is imperative for the top competitors to maintain their quality control in the factories. If a certain component of the computer keeps failing, then it is likely the fault of the component manufacturer, and not the brand name computer creator. Other key success factors include product performance, reputation/image, and customer service capabilities PORTERS FIVE FORCES MODEL OF COMPETITION Dell has been able to remain innovative in their approach to building computers. They proved throughout their years of existence that providing differentiated, customizable computers with exceptional customer service at reasonable prices is possible. During the early years, Dell was able to undercut the competition by substantial margins. When they developed their strategic plans to sell computers internationally, they were quickly able to capture some of the market share once held by super-giant IBM. As a result, in 2007 International sales accounted for over 41% of Dells sales. To expand upon their business model, they diversified their product offerings to include Dell branded speakers, printers, and ink cartridges. Though not all diversification efforts were successful, Dell proved they could be innovative in their approaches to reaching customers. Michael Dell knew exactly what he wanted to do with his business when he first started his venture, and sticking to that vision has c reated one of the most successful computer ventures ever. Rivalry Among Competing Sellers Dells rivals include more than PC manufacturers. They compete and tally revenues in the following product categories: desktop PCs, mobility products (laptop PCs and workstations), software and peripherals (printers, monitors, TVs, projectors, ink and toner cartridges), servers and networking hardware, consulting and enhanced services, and storage products. Principal competitors amongst these categories include HP, Lenovo/IBM, Apple, Acer, Toshiba, Sony, Fujitsu-Siemens, Sun Microsystems, EMC, Hitachi, Cisco, Broadcom, Enterasys, Nortel, 3Com, Airespace, Proxim, Lexmark, Canon, Epson, Accenture, and EDS. Rivalry among competitors is fierce. If one company falters even the slightest bit anywhere along the value chain, other competing companies will enter and capitalize on the transfer of market share. For example, in the first quarter of 2008, Dell had 15.7% of the total global market share, which is up from 14.8% in the fourth quarter of 2007. The rest of the competition outside of the top five competitors (HP, Dell, Acer, Lenovo, and Toshiba) lost 5% of the total market share. These numbers vary from quarter to quarter, but when the top five competitors see increases in market share, it is clear who dominates. Dell happens to offer a highly differentiated product. They pride themselves on providing high quality computers at better prices points than the competition as a result of directly selling to customers. Prior to Dell, no company successfully offered such a business concept. Sales and promotions are targeted toward special bundle packages (like monitor, printer, and computer in one purchase) and slightly dated computer designs. With Dells premier account, for example, businesses and schools are encouraged to buy specially configured computers (which can be further customized). Savings tend to be larger when consumers purchase computers bundled with an anti-virus package, and Dell warranty, and interest free payments for six months if customers own a Dell premier credit card. Though competitors like Sony offer similar incentive programs, none of them can match Dell. Though Dell was strictly direct-to-consumer oriented for the longest time, they were losing significant market share to Apple as a result of not offering their computers in stores. As a result, they agreed to a contract with Best Buy and Wal-Mart. Though customers would technically pay for the markup at Best Buy or Wal-Mart for the same computer they could purchase through Dell, this tactic helped to keep Dell from losing market share to HP and Apple. In addition, Dell began offering white-box PC solutions in 2003 which helped them achieve an additional $380 million in revenues. Though critics were skeptical of the decision to move into this segment, most saw it as an effort to take on white box dealers in China. Potential New Entrants The threat of potential new entrants is minimal if even possible. There is a considerable presence of sizable economies of scale in production and other areas of the operation include the following: a substantial amount of marketing and advertising that goes into Dells products and the ability to outsource areas of the business they cannot make profitable by locating in the US. In addition, Dell is the industry leader in minimizing inventory on hand. In addition to the economies of scale, the learning and experience effects curves have to be taken into consideration. Dell has followed the simple model of learn by doing. As a result, they have been improving efficiencies in their business model for the past eighteen and a half years (as of 2008). The competition cannot match Dell. As with any industry that has been defined for decades, there is a strong brand preference and somewhat high degrees of customer loyalty. Because Dell is focused on being the lost-cost leader in the industry, they need not worry about customers switching purely on price. Customers want an established brand name that has the proven ability to withstand the test of time. As a result, HP, Dell, Acer, Lenovo, and Toshiba will remain the top competitive global competitors for the years to come. Though Apple is a leader in the US, they will not be able to compete in price conscious countries. Because the market share is dominated by the big five, any completion will fight for the remaining half that is crowded with hundreds and thousands of un-established brands. As with most industries that have long been established, there would be extensive capital requirements for a new company. Entry would likely cost millions, is not billions of dollars. As a result, the same brand names have existed for decades. On top of that, striking deals with distributors and retail stores would prove to be difficult. What basis would new consumers have for trusting a brand new computer company? That is why Insignia failed. Assuming the company has these issues sorted out, they would still have to deal with restrictive regulatory policies and tariffs and international trade restrictions. A new threat will only exist if the company can figure out how to succeed at every one of these difficult situations. Substitute Products Substitute products are becoming an issue within the industry. As technology progresses the products of yesterday become obsolete. The smart phone is becoming the biggest threat to the personal computer. Though they are much smaller and fit in the palm of the customers hand, they are capable of doing many of the tasks that a computer can do. For users that compute on larger scales such as film makers, musicians, and reporters, the computer can never be replaced. As a result of the smart phones popularity, computer companies are now competing in this segment. Supplier Bargaining Power The supplier bargaining power through Dell is mainly weak, though there is some slight flexibility. For example, Dell cycles through the top two CPU suppliers (Intel and AMD). Because they are in fierce competition, they continue to make quality products and are normally differentiated only by price. When Dell switched to AMD in 2006, they switched because AMD was able to provide Dell with a better performing chip for a better price. Similar situations occur with peripherals like printers (switch from HP to Lexmark then Dell branded), several speaker offerings from Altec Lansing and Dell branded, and different suppliers for the motherboard. Dell will switch to the best supplier for the best price as long as component quality does not suffer. Buyer Bargaining Power Buyer bargaining power, on the other hand, is high. There are a variety of products to choose from at lower price points than the competition. Purchasing items in bundles leads to greater saving, especially if customers have a Dell premier account. In addition, refurbished or customer-returned computers are offered at even greater discounts. Because technology continually evolves, buyer preferences change, ultimately leading to product adaptations. Customers demand the best product at a better price than the competition. If Dell fails at their own mission statement, they will lose the market share they currently possess. INTERNAL ANALYSIS: SWOT STRATEGIC COST ANALYSIS Value Chain Analysis Dell aims to provide low prices on a diversified line of customizable personal computing solutions by selling direct to customers. In addition, they have an efficient supply chain and manufacturing process that allows them to maintain a leadership position in the industry. As a result, they can sell premium quality products at price points their customers can afford. Just recently to compete with Apple, they have extended their product offerings into retail stores like Best Buy and Wal-Mart. When surveys were conducted in 2008, Dell was found to be deficient in the laptop market segment. As a result, they began contracting part of their assembly process to manufacturing facilities in Asia. Once the basic assembly was completed in the Asian facilities, the half built computers were sent back to the US for final product completion. The problem was that this incurred more costs than if they outsourced the entire operation. As a result, laptops became 100% built overseas. Other cost reduction techniques include minimizing the number of days of stocked inventory. By 2002, Dell was able to minimizes their supplies to anywhere between 2.7 and 4 days. These low stocking days in addition to their purchasing model put Dell at a great advantage. When customers configure their computers online or at the kiosks, they are required to pay in full before their computer can be built. This puts Dell at a great advantage because they have the money for the computer (or other products) before the customer even has the tangible product. They also offer special deals for professional organizations, schools, and other preferred Dell account members. Because they keep a close relationship with their customers, they can create value in other areas like expanded product offerings and 24/7 customer service. Additionally, Dell runs several tests throughout the build process of the computers. Multiple levels of testing reduce the number of manufacturing errors, which furthers their cost reduction efforts. By the end of the manufacturing process, the computers are pre-loaded with an operating system and several programs to enhance buyer value. In short, when the customer receives their computer, they simply have to turn on the unit to begin us e. Dell believes that maintaining close relationships with their suppliers leads to better computers, which will improve customer satisfaction and keep costs low. Once customer satisfaction is high, they will likely buy additional products from Dell such as printers. Further, by providing twenty-four hour technical support, Dell can continue to emphasize the importance of their customers in their eyes. By outsourcing operations like laptop manufacturing and customer service call centers, Dell has found ways to produce products at better price points. Similarly, if Dell produced their own PC components, they would never be able to maintain their competitive edge. Costs for RD and production capacity would eliminate profit margins, even possibly putting Dell into a troubling situation financially. Updates to current model offerings are employed every couple of months. They include improved performance, new input device technologies (like eSata and USB 3.0) and increase energy efficiency. Benchmarking Activities In most industries, Benchmarking tends to have at least some importance in creating better products and improving efficiencies. In any technology driven industry, however, it is essential in order to survive. Dells goal is simple; they keep prices low by allowing customers to create a complete personalized computer according to pre-defined specifications. Doing this enables Dell to avoid carrying pre-configured computers in inventory. Though they do offer refurbished models for discounts, it is not a substantial part of the business. Because their business model is so unique, they can provide customizable solutions that minimize costs, eliminates much of the need for inventory carry-over, and requires customers to prepay (or set up a preferred payment account) before receiving the computer. By cutting out the middleman, Dell can pass on savings to the customer. In addition, by continually searching for ways to improve the manufacturing process, how customer orders are filled and ship ped, and how employees are trained, Dell can retain its competitive edge. Activity Based Costing Dell breaks down its individual activities of the value chain into several components that will provide cost estimates and capital requirements. Categories include advertising, researching, development, technical support (hardware and software related), selling, general, and administration, engineering, and logistics. When one activity is altered, its effects can be felt through the other activities throughout the chain. Once Dell establishes their cost estimates, they can analyze their competitiveness with companies like HP, Lenovo, and Acer. From there, they can make the necessary adjustments to maintain success. Competitive Strength Assessment Analyzing Dell for the competitive strength assessment is analyzed over two criteria. First, how does Dell rank relative to competitors on each of the important key success factors that determine market success? The second, does Dell have a net competitive advantage or disadvantage versus major competitors? Dell understands that in order to remain competitive, they must not lose sight of their business model. The continually search for ways to reduce costs along every aspect of the value chain. As a result, they fair well in the competitive strength assessment. They continue to satisfy their customers by providing total computing solutions. This assessment includes the comparison of the pre-defined industry key success factors against the top competitors: expertise in a particular technology or in scientific research, proven ability to improve production processes, and quality control know how to other competitors. In addition, other strength measures will be weighted. Included measures are product performance, reputation/image, and customer service capabilities. Once the key success factors are reviewed, the weighted overall strength rating will be determined. Weightings rank from highest (strongest) to lowest (weakest). This assessment helps pinpoint which areas Dell excels. Similarly, it also illustrates where they should improve. As illustrated by the competitive strength assessment, Dell still remains stronger than HP, but not Apple. But just because Apple ranks higher does not mean they sell more units. In 2007, Dell shipped (US) 19,645,000 units whereas Apple shipped 4,081. On a worldwide outlook, Apple is not ranked whereas HP shipped 50,526,000 and Dell shipped 39,993,000. Apples product line, however, is priced higher overall than the competition. Their theory is that extensive RD must be made to determine which parts work best together. Apple spends a great deal of time researching components to find out which ones talk best to each other. Their customers believe Apple computers tend to be more stable and last longer than the competition. Whether this is purely an advertising gimmick or legitimate fact has not been proven, but customers seem to believe this is the case. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS BUSINESS STRATEGY ANALYSIS: PORTERS GENERIC STRATEGIES Best-Cost Provider Strategy By late 1997, it was clear that Dell was defining their position in the market. They had become a low-cost leader that was discovering new ways to harness efficiencies from their direct sales business model. They wanted to provide quality computers at price points lower than the competition, and they succeeded. This strategy gave them the upper hand in the industry, and as a result, they are a top competitor with a high percentage of the overall market share. Dell achieved their best-cost status from the ability to provide customers with customizable computing solutions at lower than expected prices by cutting out the middleman. By employing this strategy over multiple product offerings, they were able to target a wide range of computer users from the business end to personal home users. Owner Michael Dell achieved this status by constantly benchmarking company performance. He continually searched for ways to improve all aspects of the business, which includes ongoing improvements in the assembly efficiency, improved quality control, enhancing partnerships with suppliers, adopting just-in-time inventory practices, website rebuild, customer service/technical support improvements, and placing Dell computers in retail stores. As a way to enhance value, Dell held forums that gave senior management the opportunity to listen to their best customers for determining future needs and expectations of buyers. In 2007, Dell began enhancing customer value through IdeaStorm, a website that allows customers to post suggestions for ways to improve the company. Improvements yield great reward, as Dell was rated number one (in 2005) for providing exceptional customer service to large enterprises. Vertical Integration When the industry was relatively new, it was essential for a PC manufacturer to be at least partially integrated. If they were not, customers did not receive their product well. That logic shifted over time, however, to the point where being vertically integrated would be detrimental to long-term company success. To not be vertically integrated is the best way for Dell to mass-produce computers. Today, Dell has an arms-length relationship between specialist suppliers, manufacturer/assemblers, and end users. It is unlikely for Dell to ever revert back and become even partially integrated, as the industry as a whole is becoming less integrated daily. Transaction Cost Economics Dell aims to keep transaction costs low and continually searches for ways to save. There are no surprises for customers when they visit the Dell website, unless medications have been made to the layout. Customers expect low prices for quality computers, and that is what they receive. Improving bargaining power between suppliers is highly unlikely, due to the fact that discounts on technology can only go so far. They are typically regulated and controlled, and have even been scrutinized for selling components for more than they are worth. Dell accepts PayPal, MasterCard, Visa, American Express and Discover credit cards in addition to their own premier account credit card. They believe that having multiple payment methods encourages customers to purchase more goods. In addition, other typical transaction cost economics include the time it takes to configure a computer online (or at one of the newly introduced kiosks), the time it takes to research what components fit customer needs the best, the time it takes to actually place an order, and the time it would take if customer service/technical support is needed. Cooperative Strategies Michael Dell believed that partnerships with suppliers would be better for the company than if it were to integrated backwards and manufacturer its own components. As a result, they have relationships with processor manufacturers Intel and AMD, hard disk drives manufacturers Seagate and Western Digital, speaker manufacturers Altec Lansing (often rebranded as Dell), and multimedia component manufacturers creative technology ltd. Other suppliers for parts like RAM, motherboards, fans, and DVD drives change depending on who supplies parts for the least amount of money. When Dell agrees to purchase components from suppliers, they are required to purchase a certain percentage of stock per order. As a result, Dell is able to demand products when needed. They can expect timely shipping and service from the suppliers as well. Suppliers often have locations within close proximity to Dells manufacturing facilities. In addition, these suppliers are often treated as Dell family members. Finally, these partnerships help drive down costs. Offensive Strategies Dells suppliers act offensively daily. They have to in order to keep up with changing technology. Coming from Dells perspective, they too act offensively. Though they are not necessarily pioneering new and better technologies, they demand the latest and great from suppliers at the quickest rate possible. They refresh their product line every few months to make it seem as though they are revamping their product line often. In addition, if there are new technologies that exist for determining ways to lower costs along the assembly line, they investigate and incorporate. They have been the leader in direct-marketing of computers and will likely remain at the top so long as they remain offensive. After all, they are the low-cost leader. Defensive Strategies Though Dells attempts at defensive strategies have not always been positive, they nevertheless attempted to fill a void in their product line. Responses to the changing marketplace include Dell televisions and Mp3 players. Though these products were highly competitive, they were never able to reach customers hands the way existing products could. This is one instance where Dells direct selling strategy proved to hurt their business model. A positive defensive strategy, however, was the release of the Inspiron notebook. Dell began outsourcing their entire laptop manufacturing operation to cut costs and maximize efficiencies. As a result, they were able to remain competitive and increase the market share that had began to lose. The global recession has also affected Dell, but most businesses have seen some sort of negative change from it anyway. First-Mover Advantages In 1984, Michael Dell began his journey of creating custom built computers sold directly to customers. This, in itself, is the first-mover advantage of the entire industry. No competitor has been able to match the success of Dell in terms of direct selling to consumers. They have had far more years of experience operating in this manner than any of the other competitors. It is for this reason Dell will likely remain the top competitor in direct-to-consumer computer sales. CORPORATE STRATEGIES: DIVERSIFICATION Beca